<p>In this paper I examine versions of the free will defence by Alvin Plantinga and Peter Van Inwagen. The free will defence states that God allows evil acts to occur because they are an inevitable outcome of granting humans free will. One could only have a world free of evil if humans were unfree. But free will is such a very great gift that a world with no free will and no evil would be worse than a world where there was free will and also evil. I argue that this defence has a fundamental flaw. It leaves something crucial out of account: the fact that acts of evil typically diminish or destroy the free will of their victims. If God wants all humans (not just powerful ones) to have the valuable gift that is free will, therefore, he has reason to prevent evil acts which take away other individuals’ free will. The free will defence is therefore paradoxical: the value of free will is no reason for allowing evil, but for restricting it.</p>