Scholarlink

<p>We study a trade-off between protecting investors and encouraging new (and possibly innovative) products on reward-based crowdfunding platforms. Informing investors about the risks of an investment opportunity can protect them from losses, but this can come at the cost of discouraging new products. A regulator that prioritizes investor interests may find it optimal to choose disclosure requirements that are not fully informative about projects. Partial disclosure enables investors to commit to sometimes funding low-quality projects, which can encourage a greater array of new products. We provide conditions under which a profit-motivated platform establishes regulator-optimal disclosure requirements and study the substitutability between the regulation of disclosure and reputation systems.</p>

错误：搜索内容不能为空，请输入英文关键词
错误：关键词超出字数限制，请精简
高级检索

Optimal Disclosure on Crowdfunding Platforms

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

    开放获取

  • 发表日期：

    2026年2月14日

查看全文
  • Ala Avoyan,
  • Robizon Khubulashvili,
  • Giorgi Mekerishvili

摘要

We study a trade-off between protecting investors and encouraging new (and possibly innovative) products on reward-based crowdfunding platforms. Informing investors about the risks of an investment opportunity can protect them from losses, but this can come at the cost of discouraging new products. A regulator that prioritizes investor interests may find it optimal to choose disclosure requirements that are not fully informative about projects. Partial disclosure enables investors to commit to sometimes funding low-quality projects, which can encourage a greater array of new products. We provide conditions under which a profit-motivated platform establishes regulator-optimal disclosure requirements and study the substitutability between the regulation of disclosure and reputation systems.