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<p>Academicand popular scrutiny of merger challenges and their subsequent outcomes have captured increasing attention in recent years. Yet, while the FTC and the DOJ (Agencies) are tasked with investigating an average of 1,624 (2001–2023) mergers annually, the Agencies’ early-stage merger investigations filter out the vast majority of mergers and leave those mergers unchallenged. In this paper, we provide what we believe to be the first quantitative analysis of the earliest stage in the merger enforcement process: the determination formally to assign a merger for early-stage scrutiny by one of the Agencies. Consistent with established Agency guidelines and economic theory, we find that industries with higher levels of intra-industry mergers and industry concentration have higher rates of early-stage scrutiny, while industries with more competitors and new entrants are less likely to face such scrutiny. Furthermore, we find that industries with higher levels of prior merger challenges are more likely to face early-stage investigations.&#xa0;</p>

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Understanding Early-Stage Merger Investigations: What Drives the Antitrust Agencies?

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年7月30日

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  • John W. Mayo,
  • Robert Press,
  • Mark Whitener

摘要

Academicand popular scrutiny of merger challenges and their subsequent outcomes have captured increasing attention in recent years. Yet, while the FTC and the DOJ (Agencies) are tasked with investigating an average of 1,624 (2001–2023) mergers annually, the Agencies’ early-stage merger investigations filter out the vast majority of mergers and leave those mergers unchallenged. In this paper, we provide what we believe to be the first quantitative analysis of the earliest stage in the merger enforcement process: the determination formally to assign a merger for early-stage scrutiny by one of the Agencies. Consistent with established Agency guidelines and economic theory, we find that industries with higher levels of intra-industry mergers and industry concentration have higher rates of early-stage scrutiny, while industries with more competitors and new entrants are less likely to face such scrutiny. Furthermore, we find that industries with higher levels of prior merger challenges are more likely to face early-stage investigations.