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<p>We study the implications of the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission’s (CRTC’s) Third-Party ISP Access (TPIA) regulation, which requires internet-service providers (ISPs) to sell access to their network to third-party providers (TPPs) at wholesale prices. We estimate households’ preferences over internet plans using novel subscription and usage data, and then calibrate a model of entry by TPPs to match the observed market structure. We use those estimates to quantify the regulator’s trade-off: Reducing the wholesale price increases TPP entry and consumer welfare, but decreases ISP revenues and the incentive to invest in networks. We then calculate the optimal wholesale price for different regulatory objectives.</p>

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Competition and Investment in Telecommunications: Evidence from CRTC’s Third-Party ISP Access

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年4月1日

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  • Matthew Ross,
  • Jonathan W. Williams

摘要

We study the implications of the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission’s (CRTC’s) Third-Party ISP Access (TPIA) regulation, which requires internet-service providers (ISPs) to sell access to their network to third-party providers (TPPs) at wholesale prices. We estimate households’ preferences over internet plans using novel subscription and usage data, and then calibrate a model of entry by TPPs to match the observed market structure. We use those estimates to quantify the regulator’s trade-off: Reducing the wholesale price increases TPP entry and consumer welfare, but decreases ISP revenues and the incentive to invest in networks. We then calculate the optimal wholesale price for different regulatory objectives.