Incentive regulation and distribution network performance: a Dutch case study (2000–2024)
摘要
This paper examines the long-term effects of incentive regulation on the financial and operational performance of Dutch electricity distribution system operators (DSOs) over the period 2000 to 2024. We construct a consistent proxy for regulated revenues to analyse cost drivers, productivity, and capital intensity across seven regulatory periods. Revenue per connection for the distribution business decreased by 0.6% per year between 2000 and 2024, masking a structural break around 2016. Overall distribution productivity improved by 2.6% per year before 2016 but declined by 4.1% per year thereafter, coinciding with increased investments and costs related to the energy transition. Using a counterfactual benchmark, we estimate cumulative efficiency gains from incentive regulation of €4.0 billion (€451 per connection). Our findings delivers cost efficiency in stable environments, it becomes less suited to periods of rapid network expansion.