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<p>This study examines the effects of China’s campaign-style environmental policy initiative (CEPI) on firm performance, with a focus on green innovation and financial outcomes. Using firm-level data and mechanism analysis, we find that CEPI enhances the long-term green innovation performance of non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs), but reduces their short-term financial performance. In contrast, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) show limited or even negative responsiveness, particularly in short-term green innovation outcomes. Mechanism analysis reveals that CEPI influences firm behavior by reducing M&amp;As in developing countries, lowering bribery levels, and increasing bribery uncertainty. Further analyses show the difference between CEPI and the 2012 anti-corruption campaign, the heterogeneity of industry, and other possible mechanisms, such as government engagement, firm R&amp;D investment, and management compensations. Our findings highlight the strategic and institutional pathways through which campaign-style regulation operates and underscore the importance of ownership structure in shaping firm adaptation. This study contributes to the literature on environmental regulation, corruption, and institutional governance by offering new insights into the dynamics of temporary enforcement and by extending its relevance to other emerging market contexts.</p>

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How does campaign-style environmental regulation benefit Chinese listed firms? Considering merger and acquisition and bribery

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年9月29日

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  • Jianquan Guo,
  • He Cheng

摘要

This study examines the effects of China’s campaign-style environmental policy initiative (CEPI) on firm performance, with a focus on green innovation and financial outcomes. Using firm-level data and mechanism analysis, we find that CEPI enhances the long-term green innovation performance of non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs), but reduces their short-term financial performance. In contrast, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) show limited or even negative responsiveness, particularly in short-term green innovation outcomes. Mechanism analysis reveals that CEPI influences firm behavior by reducing M&As in developing countries, lowering bribery levels, and increasing bribery uncertainty. Further analyses show the difference between CEPI and the 2012 anti-corruption campaign, the heterogeneity of industry, and other possible mechanisms, such as government engagement, firm R&D investment, and management compensations. Our findings highlight the strategic and institutional pathways through which campaign-style regulation operates and underscore the importance of ownership structure in shaping firm adaptation. This study contributes to the literature on environmental regulation, corruption, and institutional governance by offering new insights into the dynamics of temporary enforcement and by extending its relevance to other emerging market contexts.