<p>This paper examines the transition from exclusive card network-acquirer relationships to a multi-acquiring model. It focuses on the case of Uruguay’s adoption of multi-acquiring in 2022, implemented within the framework of a broader financial inclusion program. Uruguay offers a distinctive case where multi-acquiring emerged within the industry through institutional dialogue, unlike other experiences where regulatory mandates played a central role in driving similar market transitions. We document significant market dynamics, including restructured relationships among incumbents and new market entrants. Our descriptive analysis, leveraging the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, reveals a decline in market concentration across all payment segments. While fee reductions were initially driven by a government-sponsored price agreement, the increased competition fostered by multi-acquiring likely stabilized these rates even after the agreement was no longer in effect. Large merchants benefited from enhanced efficiency, whereas small merchants faced adaptation challenges. These findings underscore the complexities of regulating two-sided payment markets and emphasize the need for balanced interventions to ensure a competitive payment ecosystem.</p>