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<p>We conceptualize right to repair laws as requiring original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) to walk back significant first-mover advantages, much of which comprise intellectual property rights. Doing so reduces rivals’ costs, which in turn increases competition in repair markets and environmental quality. Indeed, our microeconomic theory of right to repair laws shows that the credible threat of antitrust action or passage of a right to repair law may raise social welfare, as the OEM optimally walks back some of its information advantage in order to reduce the likelihood of these interventions. Back-of-the-envelope simulation of the model yields welfare comparisons.</p>

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Raising rivals’ costs and right to repair laws: Separating the sheep from the goats?

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

    开放获取

  • 发表日期：

    2025年2月25日

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  • Michael Dortz,
  • Jeffrey Wagner

摘要

We conceptualize right to repair laws as requiring original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) to walk back significant first-mover advantages, much of which comprise intellectual property rights. Doing so reduces rivals’ costs, which in turn increases competition in repair markets and environmental quality. Indeed, our microeconomic theory of right to repair laws shows that the credible threat of antitrust action or passage of a right to repair law may raise social welfare, as the OEM optimally walks back some of its information advantage in order to reduce the likelihood of these interventions. Back-of-the-envelope simulation of the model yields welfare comparisons.