<p>This paper examines Karl Mittermaier’s critique of mechanomorphism in economics, the tendency to treat human behavior as analogous to mechanical systems governed by deterministic laws. Building on Mittermaier’s early work and his later <i>A Realist Philosophy of Economics</i> (2023), the paper examines how this conceptual metaphor emerged historically and how it continues to shape economic thought today. The first section traces the evolution of mechanomorphism from Walrasian general equilibrium to Pareto’s functional determinism, emphasizing how this transformation paved the way for increasingly formalistic and depersonalized models. The second section situates Mittermaier’s critique within a broader Austrian methodological tradition, drawing on the works of Machlup, Hayek, and Mises to defend the necessity of <i>Verstehen</i>—interpretive understanding—in the social sciences. Particular emphasis is placed on Hayek’s distinction between simple and complex phenomena and his critique of scientism. The final section identifies contemporary instantiations of mechanomorphic thinking in macroeconomic and development economics arguing these frameworks retain the same epistemological flaws Mittermaier sought to expose. The paper advocates for a reconstruction of economics on interpretive, institutional, and subjectivist foundations grounded in understanding human action within evolving rule-bound orders.</p>

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‘Mechanomorphism’ of modern economics

  • Michael Wroblewski,
  • Peter J. Boettke

摘要

This paper examines Karl Mittermaier’s critique of mechanomorphism in economics, the tendency to treat human behavior as analogous to mechanical systems governed by deterministic laws. Building on Mittermaier’s early work and his later A Realist Philosophy of Economics (2023), the paper examines how this conceptual metaphor emerged historically and how it continues to shape economic thought today. The first section traces the evolution of mechanomorphism from Walrasian general equilibrium to Pareto’s functional determinism, emphasizing how this transformation paved the way for increasingly formalistic and depersonalized models. The second section situates Mittermaier’s critique within a broader Austrian methodological tradition, drawing on the works of Machlup, Hayek, and Mises to defend the necessity of Verstehen—interpretive understanding—in the social sciences. Particular emphasis is placed on Hayek’s distinction between simple and complex phenomena and his critique of scientism. The final section identifies contemporary instantiations of mechanomorphic thinking in macroeconomic and development economics arguing these frameworks retain the same epistemological flaws Mittermaier sought to expose. The paper advocates for a reconstruction of economics on interpretive, institutional, and subjectivist foundations grounded in understanding human action within evolving rule-bound orders.