<p>The purpose of this paper is two-fold. Its <i>negative</i> part consists in illuminating the shortcomings of Callahan’s alleged demonstration of how acratic action can be conceptualized on praxeological grounds. First, we submit that Callahan misidentifies the tenet of praxeology that the phenomenon of akrasia apparently poses a threat to, as he says that it is <i>rationality</i>, as conceived of by Mises, that is at stake. Then we level a criticism at Callahan’s invocation of varying time preference rates exhibited by the supposed akrates, which is designed to capture the phenomenon of akrasia. We hold that this attempt may only partly succeed at best, as it still fails to illuminate what Mele dubs a “strict akratic action”. On a positive note, we recall that praxeology does not allow for a counterpreferential choice. For, in Mises’s view, it is an analytic truth that <i>all-things-considered preferences</i> are perfectly aligned with actual choices, the point Callahan himself acknowledges. Alternatively, on the Rothbardian view, one’s choices are <i>evidentiary</i> of preferences underlying them. This position also predicts that there is no possible world in which the actor chooses suboptimally. Thus, we conclude that the phenomenon of <i>akrasia</i> is inconsistent with praxeology.</p>