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<p>Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) enables information-theoretic security, yet existing protocols remain vulnerable to synchronization and timing-based side-channel attacks—a critical class of vulnerabilities largely unaddressed in the state of the art. We propose a hybrid BB84–E91 QKD protocol that interleaves prepare-and-measure BB84 rounds for efficient key generation with entanglement-assisted E91 verification rounds that certify device integrity via CHSH inequality violations. Within the composable finite-key framework, security is rigorously proven using the Entropy Accumulation Theorem (EAT), establishing explicit key length bounds against general adversaries. Numerical evaluation with NetSquid and OMNeT++ simulators demonstrates that the hybrid achieves BB84-level efficiency at short distances, while sustaining secure key rates in the 150–200&#xa0;km medium-distance regime under synchronization noise where BB84 aborts. Importantly, our analysis formally shows that the hybrid strictly extends the secure operating regime beyond BB84, a property not achieved by TF-QKD, MDI-QKD, or CV-QKD. These results establish the proposed scheme as the first composably secure QKD protocol explicitly resilient to synchronization and timing attacks, positioning it as a practical and synchronization-robust candidate for next-generation quantum communication networks.</p>

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Composable security of a hybrid BB84–E91 protocol: toward synchronization-resilient quantum key distribution

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年2月11日

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  • Gaurav Thakur,
  • Pradeep Chouksey,
  • Mayank Chopra,
  • Parveen Sadotra,
  • Megha Vashishtha,
  • Sumit Vashishtha,
  • Sunil Kumar

摘要

Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) enables information-theoretic security, yet existing protocols remain vulnerable to synchronization and timing-based side-channel attacks—a critical class of vulnerabilities largely unaddressed in the state of the art. We propose a hybrid BB84–E91 QKD protocol that interleaves prepare-and-measure BB84 rounds for efficient key generation with entanglement-assisted E91 verification rounds that certify device integrity via CHSH inequality violations. Within the composable finite-key framework, security is rigorously proven using the Entropy Accumulation Theorem (EAT), establishing explicit key length bounds against general adversaries. Numerical evaluation with NetSquid and OMNeT++ simulators demonstrates that the hybrid achieves BB84-level efficiency at short distances, while sustaining secure key rates in the 150–200 km medium-distance regime under synchronization noise where BB84 aborts. Importantly, our analysis formally shows that the hybrid strictly extends the secure operating regime beyond BB84, a property not achieved by TF-QKD, MDI-QKD, or CV-QKD. These results establish the proposed scheme as the first composably secure QKD protocol explicitly resilient to synchronization and timing attacks, positioning it as a practical and synchronization-robust candidate for next-generation quantum communication networks.