<p>This paper studies how social identification reshapes the political economy of law enforcement. In a two-class economy with property crime, individuals choose whether to offend, vote over the detection probability under majority rule, and choose whether to identify with their class or with the encompassing nation. In the absence of identity concerns, class-specific material preferences over enforcement depend on victimization exposure, tax incidence, and the option value of offending. With class identification, voters place greater weight on the relative payoff of their own group, so social identity amplifies the underlying distributive conflict. With national identification, voters place greater weight on aggregate payoffs, compressing preferred enforcement levels across groups. Endogenous identity choice produces distinct political regimes and can generate multiple equilibria: societies in which class differences are more salient in identity space are more likely to sustain class identification and more extreme enforcement outcomes, whereas higher national prestige favors national identification and policies closer to the aggregate benchmark. An extension in which offending carries an action-based social deviance cost preserves the main mechanism and shows how compliance norms can reinforce class-based identity.</p>