<p>In societies where ethnic identity is salient and political institutions are weak, parties often promise ethnicity-specific public goods during elections – promises that voters view with skepticism. These strategies involve a trade-off between mobilizing co-ethnic voters and alienating others. Weak institutions increase the rent from office and lower the cost of reneging on promises. This paper analyzes equilibrium policy outcomes when candidates value both winning and implementing their preferred ethnicity-specific public goods, with deviations from announced platforms being costly. It provides a complete characterization of equilibrium policy implementation across all possible configurations of party ideal platforms. We find that even with low positive costs of non-commitment and office motivation, parties choose to announce their ideal platforms in equilibrium, regardless of bias alignment. This “ideal implementation zone” contracts as non-commitment costs and office motivation increase. When parties have opposing ethnic biases, the zone expands for the majority-biased party and contracts for the minority-biased one as the majority’s size increases. Additionally, we find that the higher provisioning of ethnic public goods is more likely in poorer societies characterized by a large majority group and weak political institutions.</p>