Scholarlink

<p>When are politicians incentivized to vote? To answer this question, we examine politicians’ electoral participation before, during and after their political career. Our dataset combines individual-level register data for all candidates in the 2015, 2019, and 2023 Norwegian local elections with population-wide turnout data. We show that politicians are significantly more likely to vote when they are running for office (relative to pre- <i>and</i> post-office electoral participation), particularly if placed in top-ranked list positions and running for parties with council representation. Candidates in ‘contested’ list positions appear to exhibit higher turnout than those in ‘hopeless’ positions, but this gap disappears when controlling for individual fixed effects. Finally, post-office electoral participation exceeds pre-office participation after accounting for individual fixed effects, suggesting some degree of persistence and habit-formation. Overall, these findings contribute to a better understanding of how candidates’ personal ambitions and electoral incentives interact with institutional features to influence electoral behavior.</p>

错误：搜索内容不能为空，请输入英文关键词
错误：关键词超出字数限制，请精简
高级检索

When are politicians incentivized to vote? Evidence from individual-level panel data (2015–2023)

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

    开放获取

  • 发表日期：

    2026年4月29日

查看全文
  • Benny Geys,
  • Rune Jørgen Sørensen

摘要

When are politicians incentivized to vote? To answer this question, we examine politicians’ electoral participation before, during and after their political career. Our dataset combines individual-level register data for all candidates in the 2015, 2019, and 2023 Norwegian local elections with population-wide turnout data. We show that politicians are significantly more likely to vote when they are running for office (relative to pre- and post-office electoral participation), particularly if placed in top-ranked list positions and running for parties with council representation. Candidates in ‘contested’ list positions appear to exhibit higher turnout than those in ‘hopeless’ positions, but this gap disappears when controlling for individual fixed effects. Finally, post-office electoral participation exceeds pre-office participation after accounting for individual fixed effects, suggesting some degree of persistence and habit-formation. Overall, these findings contribute to a better understanding of how candidates’ personal ambitions and electoral incentives interact with institutional features to influence electoral behavior.