Scholarlink

<p>Using a panel of U.S. states from 2004 to 2019, we test whether economic freedom is associated with reductions in labor allocated to rent seeking. We proxy rent seeking with employment shares in private legal services and lobbying and relate these outcomes to changes in the Economic Freedom of North America index. Across specifications, higher economic freedom is robustly associated with lower employment shares in private legal services, while the lobbying relationship is negative but sensitive to specification. Decomposing the index shows that the government spending component is the strongest predictor of lower rent seeking, consistent with a mechanism in which larger public budgets, through redistribution, targeted transfers, and procurement, increase opportunities for influence activities and draw labor into rent seeking occupations. Our findings are robust to dynamic panel specifications that accommodate persistence and to alternative designs that mitigate simultaneity.</p>

错误：搜索内容不能为空，请输入英文关键词
错误：关键词超出字数限制，请精简
高级检索

Economic freedom and rent seeking: evidence from US states

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年4月2日

查看全文
  • Fernando A. M. C. D’Andrea,
  • Hugo Vaca Pereira Rocha,
  • Nicholas Jensen,
  • Vitor Melo,
  • Zachary D. Blizard

摘要

Using a panel of U.S. states from 2004 to 2019, we test whether economic freedom is associated with reductions in labor allocated to rent seeking. We proxy rent seeking with employment shares in private legal services and lobbying and relate these outcomes to changes in the Economic Freedom of North America index. Across specifications, higher economic freedom is robustly associated with lower employment shares in private legal services, while the lobbying relationship is negative but sensitive to specification. Decomposing the index shows that the government spending component is the strongest predictor of lower rent seeking, consistent with a mechanism in which larger public budgets, through redistribution, targeted transfers, and procurement, increase opportunities for influence activities and draw labor into rent seeking occupations. Our findings are robust to dynamic panel specifications that accommodate persistence and to alternative designs that mitigate simultaneity.