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<p>Despite a comprehensive rulebook, NASCAR drivers historically adhered to an informal “Driver Code,” a decentralized system of self-governance that maintained order and sportsmanship through peer-enforced norms. Using Ellickson’s framework of norm emergence in close-knit groups, this paper examines how institutional changes within NASCAR—such as the introduction of the Playoff system, Green-White-Checkers, and restrictions on veteran participation in lower series—have systematically undermined the conditions that sustained this informal governance. These rule changes have disrupted low-cost information flows, removed opportunities for peer sanctioning, and shortened drivers’ planning horizons, incentivizing short-term aggression over long-term cooperation. As a result, the Driver Code has eroded. This paper contributes to the literature on self-governance by illustrating how formal rule changes can unintentionally weaken decentralized enforcement mechanisms, leading to the decline of once-effective norms.</p>

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When rubbin’ becomes wreckin’: the death of the driver code in NASCAR

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年1月7日

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  • Antón Chamberlin

摘要

Despite a comprehensive rulebook, NASCAR drivers historically adhered to an informal “Driver Code,” a decentralized system of self-governance that maintained order and sportsmanship through peer-enforced norms. Using Ellickson’s framework of norm emergence in close-knit groups, this paper examines how institutional changes within NASCAR—such as the introduction of the Playoff system, Green-White-Checkers, and restrictions on veteran participation in lower series—have systematically undermined the conditions that sustained this informal governance. These rule changes have disrupted low-cost information flows, removed opportunities for peer sanctioning, and shortened drivers’ planning horizons, incentivizing short-term aggression over long-term cooperation. As a result, the Driver Code has eroded. This paper contributes to the literature on self-governance by illustrating how formal rule changes can unintentionally weaken decentralized enforcement mechanisms, leading to the decline of once-effective norms.