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<p>Conventional wisdom indicates that certain institutional reforms strengthen the judiciary, while others curb its authority. However, even court-empowering reforms can undermine judicial independence. Reforms often create new vacancies by prompting the resignation of sitting judges or expanding the size of the court. Judicial turnover thus creates opportunities for the reforming parties to appoint loyal judges. We document that court-empowering reforms produce judicial turnover by analyzing the retirement patterns of about 4000 justices who served in Latin American Supreme Courts and constitutional tribunals between 1900 and 2021.</p>

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The paradox of judicial reforms in Latin America

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

    开放获取

  • 发表日期：

    2026年1月22日

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  • Andrea Castagnola,
  • Aníbal Pérez-Liñán

摘要

Conventional wisdom indicates that certain institutional reforms strengthen the judiciary, while others curb its authority. However, even court-empowering reforms can undermine judicial independence. Reforms often create new vacancies by prompting the resignation of sitting judges or expanding the size of the court. Judicial turnover thus creates opportunities for the reforming parties to appoint loyal judges. We document that court-empowering reforms produce judicial turnover by analyzing the retirement patterns of about 4000 justices who served in Latin American Supreme Courts and constitutional tribunals between 1900 and 2021.