Scholarlink

<p>We consider a two-player asymmetric dynamic contest with a binary effort choice and a finite number of periods, in which one player wins if and only if he is able to surprise his rival by attacking first. The unique subgame perfect equilibrium in mixed strategies, in which the probability of a surprise increases over time, is examined. It is found that the chance of a surprise is highest at the “last minute.” Nonetheless, it remains small if the cost of effort is small. With an infinite horizon, the probability remains constant over time; however, it increases as players become more impatient. Applications are discussed.</p>

错误：搜索内容不能为空，请输入英文关键词
错误：关键词超出字数限制，请精简
高级检索

Surprise in contests

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

    开放获取

  • 发表日期：

    2025年12月12日

查看全文
  • Doron Klunover

摘要

We consider a two-player asymmetric dynamic contest with a binary effort choice and a finite number of periods, in which one player wins if and only if he is able to surprise his rival by attacking first. The unique subgame perfect equilibrium in mixed strategies, in which the probability of a surprise increases over time, is examined. It is found that the chance of a surprise is highest at the “last minute.” Nonetheless, it remains small if the cost of effort is small. With an infinite horizon, the probability remains constant over time; however, it increases as players become more impatient. Applications are discussed.