<p>The Italian electoral system introduced in 2017 represents a unique experiment within the broad realm of mixed electoral systems, meriting both theoretical reflection and empirical investigation. This article examines the design of the system and evaluates its effects on political parties, voters, and the party system alike in the 2018 and 2022 general elections. We analyze how the competing incentives of the majoritarian and proportional tiers shaped the strategic behavior of political parties and voters. For parties, the system incentivized coalition formation in single-member districts (SMDs) but permitted independent competition in multi-member districts (MMDs). Yet, this coordination proved partial and uneven—with center-left parties struggling to fully leverage the majoritarian incentives. Voters, on the other hand, largely ignored the SMD tier and behaved as if the system were purely proportional. Strategic voting was minimal, as voters focused on party lists in the proportional tier. These patterns of limited or absent strategic behavior resulted not only from the specific design of the electoral system, but also, and more crucially, from contextual factors—such as high electoral volatility and the structures of party competition observed in the two elections.</p>