Scholarlink

<p>Can incentive schemes deliver value in the public sector, despite major principal-agent challenges? We evaluate a reform that introduced individual teacher performance-related pay and tournaments in public schools in Portugal, despite trade union opposition. We find evidence that the focus on individual performance decreased student achievement (as measured by national exams) and increased grade inflation. The results follow from a difference-in-differences analysis of matched student-school panels and two complementary control groups (including private schools). Students with a higher proportion of teachers exposed to tournaments also perform worse. Overall, our results highlight the social costs of disrupting workers’ cooperation, a possible unintended consequence of public-sector tournaments.</p>

错误：搜索内容不能为空，请输入英文关键词
错误：关键词超出字数限制，请精简
高级检索

Effects of individual incentive reforms in the public sector: the case of teachers

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

    开放获取

  • 发表日期：

    2025年1月31日

查看全文
  • Pedro S. Martins,
  • João R. Ferreira

摘要

Can incentive schemes deliver value in the public sector, despite major principal-agent challenges? We evaluate a reform that introduced individual teacher performance-related pay and tournaments in public schools in Portugal, despite trade union opposition. We find evidence that the focus on individual performance decreased student achievement (as measured by national exams) and increased grade inflation. The results follow from a difference-in-differences analysis of matched student-school panels and two complementary control groups (including private schools). Students with a higher proportion of teachers exposed to tournaments also perform worse. Overall, our results highlight the social costs of disrupting workers’ cooperation, a possible unintended consequence of public-sector tournaments.