<p>Do enfranchisement reforms change the demographic composition of elected bodies? While previous research has demonstrated positive effects of suffrage extensions on political participation and the substantive representation of group interests, effects on descriptive representation remain understudied. Focusing on voting age reforms, we hypothesize that lowering the voting age to 16 increases the shares of selected and elected young candidates via changes in party and voter behavior. Drawing on evidence from two Norwegian voting age trials and a difference-in-differences design, we show that municipalities with a lowered voting age saw significantly more young candidates elected. This was driven by changes in voter behavior: While parties did not select or prioritize more young candidates, voters supported them with higher shares of preference votes. Exploring mechanisms, we find tentative evidence that treatment effects depended on voters who were not directly affected by the reform. Also, effects appear to slightly weaken in the second election with a lowered voting age.</p>

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Does Enfranchisement Increase Descriptive Representation? The Case of Voting Age Reforms

  • Jana Belschner,
  • Jacob Aars,
  • Jo Saglie

摘要

Do enfranchisement reforms change the demographic composition of elected bodies? While previous research has demonstrated positive effects of suffrage extensions on political participation and the substantive representation of group interests, effects on descriptive representation remain understudied. Focusing on voting age reforms, we hypothesize that lowering the voting age to 16 increases the shares of selected and elected young candidates via changes in party and voter behavior. Drawing on evidence from two Norwegian voting age trials and a difference-in-differences design, we show that municipalities with a lowered voting age saw significantly more young candidates elected. This was driven by changes in voter behavior: While parties did not select or prioritize more young candidates, voters supported them with higher shares of preference votes. Exploring mechanisms, we find tentative evidence that treatment effects depended on voters who were not directly affected by the reform. Also, effects appear to slightly weaken in the second election with a lowered voting age.