Scholarlink

<p>Simulationism is a leading philosophical theory of remembering characterized by three ideas: continuism (remembering and imagining are constituted by one and the same natural kind), anticausalism (one may remember an event without an appropriate causal connection to it), and mnemic reliabilism (successful remembering requires process reliability). At the heart of this radical trio of claims is <i>identity-of-process</i>: a single simulative process <i>just is</i> the psychological basis of both remembering and imagining. Though simulationism has faced much criticism, this has seldom engaged with the theory on its own methodological terms. In this paper, we argue that commitment to identity-of-process generates a dilemma. If simulationists take identity-of-process seriously, they eliminate remembering as a natural kind, undermining the very explanatory ambitions of a naturalistic theory of remembering, and lose their grip on mnemic success and error. If they abandon identity-of-process, however, simulationism becomes a discontinuist view, one compatible with causalism, thus jeopardizing its status as a distinct or radical proposal. We conclude by examining strategies for escaping the dilemma and reflect on its implications for broader debates concerning (dis)continuism and the individuation of mental kinds, (anti)causalism, and naturalistic methodology in philosophy of memory.</p>

错误：搜索内容不能为空，请输入英文关键词
错误：关键词超出字数限制，请精简
高级检索

A dilemma for simulationism

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年7月11日

查看全文
  • Nikola Andonovski,
  • Rebecca Copenhaver,
  • James Openshaw

摘要

Simulationism is a leading philosophical theory of remembering characterized by three ideas: continuism (remembering and imagining are constituted by one and the same natural kind), anticausalism (one may remember an event without an appropriate causal connection to it), and mnemic reliabilism (successful remembering requires process reliability). At the heart of this radical trio of claims is identity-of-process: a single simulative process just is the psychological basis of both remembering and imagining. Though simulationism has faced much criticism, this has seldom engaged with the theory on its own methodological terms. In this paper, we argue that commitment to identity-of-process generates a dilemma. If simulationists take identity-of-process seriously, they eliminate remembering as a natural kind, undermining the very explanatory ambitions of a naturalistic theory of remembering, and lose their grip on mnemic success and error. If they abandon identity-of-process, however, simulationism becomes a discontinuist view, one compatible with causalism, thus jeopardizing its status as a distinct or radical proposal. We conclude by examining strategies for escaping the dilemma and reflect on its implications for broader debates concerning (dis)continuism and the individuation of mental kinds, (anti)causalism, and naturalistic methodology in philosophy of memory.