The normative structure of imperfection

Many philosophers have attempted to draw a distinction between perfect and imperfect duties. Roughly, imperfect duties are supposed to be obligations that allow for latitude, or room for choice, in complying with them. Beneficence is typically given as the paradigm example. Examples of perfect duties include our obligations not to harm others, and our obligations to keep promises. While there seems to be a real distinction here, we argue that philosophers so far have not understood it. Existing accounts may identify aspects of imperfect duties, but they do not provide a proper account of the source and nature of the normative demands imperfect duties make on us. This paper aims to change this. In our view, the near-exclusive focus on beneficence as an example of imperfect duties has had an obscuring effect. Through attending to and thinking closely about other examples, we will develop a new understanding of the distinctive nature and grounds of imperfect duties, of what differentiates them from perfect duties, and of their significance in the normative domain.