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<p>I argue for the possibility of suboptimal knowledge: knowledge that’s defective given that the knower ought to inquire. I do this by uniting two independently plausible claims from the literature on inquiry that, at first glance, appear incompatible: there’s the Ignorance Norm, according to which one ought not know that <i>p</i> and inquire into whether <i>p</i>; and there’s the idea that, even if one knows that <i>p</i>, they may still be obligated to inquire into whether <i>p</i>. As I explain, these principles entail the possibility of suboptimal knowledge. Once this argument for suboptimal knowledge is in place, I go on to defend it. Along the way, I identify the relevance and utility of suboptimal knowledge for debates about the epistemic significance of unpossessed evidence, the relationship between knowledge and stakes, and zetetic normativity more generally.</p>

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Suboptimal knowledge

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年6月15日

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  • Nathan Lauffer

摘要

I argue for the possibility of suboptimal knowledge: knowledge that’s defective given that the knower ought to inquire. I do this by uniting two independently plausible claims from the literature on inquiry that, at first glance, appear incompatible: there’s the Ignorance Norm, according to which one ought not know that p and inquire into whether p; and there’s the idea that, even if one knows that p, they may still be obligated to inquire into whether p. As I explain, these principles entail the possibility of suboptimal knowledge. Once this argument for suboptimal knowledge is in place, I go on to defend it. Along the way, I identify the relevance and utility of suboptimal knowledge for debates about the epistemic significance of unpossessed evidence, the relationship between knowledge and stakes, and zetetic normativity more generally.