<p>Rapid advances in virtual reality technology raise a host of questions about the moral and legal status of virtual actions. This essay offers a foundation for addressing these questions by providing a metaphysics of virtual action. According to the proposed metaphysics, the actions of one’s avatar can be one’s own actions. We argue for this conclusion by arguing for the following: (i) in sophisticated forms of virtual reality, one’s avatar can come to constitute a part of one’s self and (ii) the sphere of one’s agency is precisely the sphere of one’s self. Thus, there is a distinctive form of agency made possible by sophisticated virtual realities: <i>avatarial action</i>, an action of a real-world agent performed through their avatar in a virtual world. In defending our metaphysics of virtual action, we also illustrate how coming to a clear understanding of the nature of virtual action—and thus a clear understanding of the moral and legal status of virtual actions—requires attending to the nature of self and action and their capacity to be transformed through technological engagement.</p>

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Action, self, and virtual reality

  • Mikayla Kelley,
  • Hannah H. Kim

摘要

Rapid advances in virtual reality technology raise a host of questions about the moral and legal status of virtual actions. This essay offers a foundation for addressing these questions by providing a metaphysics of virtual action. According to the proposed metaphysics, the actions of one’s avatar can be one’s own actions. We argue for this conclusion by arguing for the following: (i) in sophisticated forms of virtual reality, one’s avatar can come to constitute a part of one’s self and (ii) the sphere of one’s agency is precisely the sphere of one’s self. Thus, there is a distinctive form of agency made possible by sophisticated virtual realities: avatarial action, an action of a real-world agent performed through their avatar in a virtual world. In defending our metaphysics of virtual action, we also illustrate how coming to a clear understanding of the nature of virtual action—and thus a clear understanding of the moral and legal status of virtual actions—requires attending to the nature of self and action and their capacity to be transformed through technological engagement.