Scholarlink

<p>If one asks oneself <i>whether to believe that p</i> from the first-person perspective, one understands this question is answered in, and only in, answering a second question – <i>whether p</i>. I propose a straightforward new explanation of such ‘transparency’: it is because one understands believing something is thinking it is true. This ‘Simple Explanation’ was overlooked due to the notion in the early literature (Shah, <CitationRef CitationID="CR15">2003</CitationRef>; Shah &amp; Velleman, <CitationRef CitationID="CR16">2005</CitationRef>) that ‘thinking it is true that <i>p</i>’ does not uniquely identify belief. I argue that this is false and hence that we can explain transparency the simple way.</p>

错误：搜索内容不能为空，请输入英文关键词
错误：关键词超出字数限制，请精简
高级检索

Explaining transparency the simple way

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

    开放获取

  • 发表日期：

    2026年6月3日

查看全文
  • Sophie Archer

摘要

If one asks oneself whether to believe that p from the first-person perspective, one understands this question is answered in, and only in, answering a second question – whether p. I propose a straightforward new explanation of such ‘transparency’: it is because one understands believing something is thinking it is true. This ‘Simple Explanation’ was overlooked due to the notion in the early literature (Shah, 2003; Shah & Velleman, 2005) that ‘thinking it is true that p’ does not uniquely identify belief. I argue that this is false and hence that we can explain transparency the simple way.