<p>This paper develops a conception of affective self-respect and discusses its relevance to affective injustice. It starts from Gallegos’ concept of affective goods: goods the possession of which is good for us as affective beings and makes our affective lives go well. Within this framework, it proposes that an affirmative relation to one’s affectivity is an affective good. Drawing on Dillon’s account of self-respect, it argues that we should acknowledge a dimension of recognition self-respect concerned with the significance our affectivity has for us: affective self-respect. It presents examples of agents who lack this affirmative relation to their affective nature to provide a sketch of what having affective self-respect entails. The paper then examines the value of affective self-respect and how it can be a site of affective injustice. Affective self-respect is shown to be intrinsically valuable as an affirmative way of relating to what one is like, an apt valuing response, and an enabler of other affective goods. Due to its importance, we may have moral claims to what contributes to it and against what threatens it. Furthermore, many recognized forms of affective injustice involve threats to affective self-respect, which partly explains their wrongness. Finally, having unimpaired affective self-respect likely mitigates the harms of many forms of affective injustice. The paper thus aims to show not only that affective self-respect is a central aspect of the psychology of affective beings but also how attending to it contributes to our understanding of how we can be wronged in affective regards.</p>