<p>I propose a view of intentionality that takes it to have first arisen in purposive behavior. The idea of purposive behavior is adapted from Tolman’s work in the 1920s: it is behavior with what he calls <i>persistence until</i> character. He names his brand of behaviorism “purposive behaviorism,” so I suggest “purposive functionalism.” I interpret purpose in an enactivist spirit, and argue that purposive behavior enacts a thin sort of normativity which can ground mental state functions. This inverts priority in two common orders of analysis: the intentional meaning of (basic) mental states depends on purpose that is in behavior (not behaviors gaining meaning from intentions) and mental state functions depend on basic norms that are built into purposive behavior (not norms depending on functions). In short, purpose before intentionality, and norms before functions. Because purposive behavior occurs in living beings, other forms of biological teleology may already be present. As such, views that describe such other kinds of teleology need not be competitors for this view, and they can instead help explain the emergence of purposive behavior. In turn, this basic form of intentionality may allow the later emergence of other kinds of mental state.</p>