Scholarlink

<p>This paper argues that two of the theoretical virtues—ontological and ideological parsimony—reduce to a more foundational and familiar theoretical imperative to avoid positing brute facts. Following recent developments in metaphysics, I characterize ontological and ideological parsimony as principles that impose theoretical costs on <i>fundamental</i> ontology and <i>primitive</i> ideology respectively. I subsequently argue that both sorts of theoretical commitment entail costly <i>brute</i> (i.e., ungrounded) commitments. We can thus understand ontological and ideological parsimony as reducing to <i>brute fact parsimony</i>. After defending this proposal against objections, I extend it to the non-fundamental by introducing the notion of <i>domain-relative</i> bruteness, thereby explaining parsimony’s role in the special sciences. If my argument is successful, then it is now possible to weigh previously incommensurable virtues against each other. I suggest that this may facilitate progress in the debate about the laws of nature.</p>

错误：搜索内容不能为空，请输入英文关键词
错误：关键词超出字数限制，请精简
高级检索

Brute fact parsimony

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

    开放获取

  • 发表日期：

    2026年2月4日

查看全文
  • James H. McIntyre

摘要

This paper argues that two of the theoretical virtues—ontological and ideological parsimony—reduce to a more foundational and familiar theoretical imperative to avoid positing brute facts. Following recent developments in metaphysics, I characterize ontological and ideological parsimony as principles that impose theoretical costs on fundamental ontology and primitive ideology respectively. I subsequently argue that both sorts of theoretical commitment entail costly brute (i.e., ungrounded) commitments. We can thus understand ontological and ideological parsimony as reducing to brute fact parsimony. After defending this proposal against objections, I extend it to the non-fundamental by introducing the notion of domain-relative bruteness, thereby explaining parsimony’s role in the special sciences. If my argument is successful, then it is now possible to weigh previously incommensurable virtues against each other. I suggest that this may facilitate progress in the debate about the laws of nature.