Uncertainty in the absence of fact
摘要
I observe a range of cases in which it is possible to suspend belief about whether p and yet lack any degree of subjective uncertainty whether p. Each of these cases concerns a particular kind of predicate, which I call reactive, identified by their being felicitously embeddable under finds in the construction, S finds x R. I show how we can predict these otherwise puzzling observations within a semantic theory of reactive claims on which they are non-factual. I conjecture that non-factual claims only have probabilities when they are determined by probabilities about matters of fact; thus, in certain cases, non-factual claims can fail to be more or less likely true. Two upshots follow. First, it opens a new avenue for exploring how to integrate the language of subjective uncertainty with fine-grained semantic theories such as relativism and expressivism. Second, it suggests a new way to think about the relationship between fact-stating and non-fact stating domains of discourse: the possibility of indecision without uncertainty is a mark of the non-factual.