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<p>I raise a puzzle about the ‘phenomenological particularity’ of hallucination. It seems possible for it to appear to a hallucinator that a particular object is present though no object is. But I show how difficult this is to sustain. I argue that if it seems <i>a particular</i> object is present, there must be an object that seems present. So if a hallucination has phenomenological particularity, it must be of an object.</p>

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A puzzle about hallucination

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年1月21日

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  • David Balcarras

摘要

I raise a puzzle about the ‘phenomenological particularity’ of hallucination. It seems possible for it to appear to a hallucinator that a particular object is present though no object is. But I show how difficult this is to sustain. I argue that if it seems a particular object is present, there must be an object that seems present. So if a hallucination has phenomenological particularity, it must be of an object.