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<p>The fact that it is essential that <i>p</i> in some sense explains that <i>p</i>. This paper makes one negative and one positive contribution. Negatively, the paper argues that the sense of explanation is not <i>ground</i>, and we prove—contra Vogt—that the issue has nothing to do with whether one works with a representational or worldly notion of ground. Positively, the paper proposes an inferentialist account of essence and uses that to develop an account of essentialist explanation.</p>

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Towards an inferentialist account of essentialist explanation

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  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年1月27日

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  • Jon Erling Litland,
  • Taylor-Grey Miller

摘要

The fact that it is essential that p in some sense explains that p. This paper makes one negative and one positive contribution. Negatively, the paper argues that the sense of explanation is not ground, and we prove—contra Vogt—that the issue has nothing to do with whether one works with a representational or worldly notion of ground. Positively, the paper proposes an inferentialist account of essence and uses that to develop an account of essentialist explanation.