<p>We provide a reply to the Argument from Intimacy on behalf of defenders of emergent spacetime in theories of quantum gravity. We argue that if one accepts that spacetime regions are nowhere in the sense that they are locations but do not have locations, then the Argument from Intimacy can be resolved. We go on to consider a problem with this response, namely that it is unavailable to super-substantivalists. We argue that this is right for <i>identity</i> but not <i>priority</i> super-substantivalists. We then suggest that there is no cost for our solution here, since identity versions of super-substantivalism face severe challenges in the context of spacetime emergence and so should be rejected anyway.</p>

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Spacetime emergence and the fear of intimacy

  • Sam Baron,
  • Claudio Calosi,
  • Cristian Mariani

摘要

We provide a reply to the Argument from Intimacy on behalf of defenders of emergent spacetime in theories of quantum gravity. We argue that if one accepts that spacetime regions are nowhere in the sense that they are locations but do not have locations, then the Argument from Intimacy can be resolved. We go on to consider a problem with this response, namely that it is unavailable to super-substantivalists. We argue that this is right for identity but not priority super-substantivalists. We then suggest that there is no cost for our solution here, since identity versions of super-substantivalism face severe challenges in the context of spacetime emergence and so should be rejected anyway.