Scholarlink

<p>According to a popular account, epistemic reparations are intentionally reparative actions in the form of epistemic goods that perpetrators ought to give back to their victims in order to acknowledge the wrong and as a way to redress it. This account, due to Lackey (Proc Address Am Philos Assoc 96:54–89, 2022), conceives of reparations as fundamentally <i>transactional obligations</i>—i.e., obligations regulating epistemic exchanges between victim and perpetrator. In this paper, I look at the case of the military ‘comfort system’ in Japan during World War II to argue for an extension of Lackey’s framework to include epistemic reparations as <i>structural obligations</i>—i.e., obligations regarding the organisation and management of the resources and the background epistemic conditions that regulate interpersonal epistemic exchanges between agents. The upshot is the formulation of an account of <i>structural epistemic reparation</i>. If I am right, the notion of structural epistemic reparations becomes a fundamental theoretical tool for understanding (i) what’s at stake in major violations of human rights cases, like that of colonialism, and (ii) what we should do to take up our responsibility to right these wrongs.</p>

错误：搜索内容不能为空，请输入英文关键词
错误：关键词超出字数限制，请精简
高级检索

Structural epistemic reparations: lessons from the military comfort system in Japan during World War II

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年12月13日

查看全文
  • Martin Miragoli

摘要

According to a popular account, epistemic reparations are intentionally reparative actions in the form of epistemic goods that perpetrators ought to give back to their victims in order to acknowledge the wrong and as a way to redress it. This account, due to Lackey (Proc Address Am Philos Assoc 96:54–89, 2022), conceives of reparations as fundamentally transactional obligations—i.e., obligations regulating epistemic exchanges between victim and perpetrator. In this paper, I look at the case of the military ‘comfort system’ in Japan during World War II to argue for an extension of Lackey’s framework to include epistemic reparations as structural obligations—i.e., obligations regarding the organisation and management of the resources and the background epistemic conditions that regulate interpersonal epistemic exchanges between agents. The upshot is the formulation of an account of structural epistemic reparation. If I am right, the notion of structural epistemic reparations becomes a fundamental theoretical tool for understanding (i) what’s at stake in major violations of human rights cases, like that of colonialism, and (ii) what we should do to take up our responsibility to right these wrongs.