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<p>I present a game-theoretic analysis of Socrates’ moral theory, using the cooperate/defect framework of Prisoner’s Dilemma and Stag Hunt, the two most commonly used game-theoretic models in moral and political philosophy. Based on Plato’s <i>Apology</i>, <i>Crito</i>, and <i>Gorgias</i>, I argue that Socrates presents a preference ordering even more cooperative than that of Stag Hunt. One version is consistent with what Vlastos (1991) calls the Identity Thesis, where an agent’s virtue is the only determinant of her happiness, and the other is consistent with the Sufficiency Thesis, whereby the agent’s virtue is the major determinant of her happiness, but conventional goods also affect this. A repeated-game analysis suggests that, contrary to Vlastos, and consistent with Annas (1999), the Identity Thesis better represents Socrates’ moral theory than does the Sufficiency Thesis, in that only with the former does the agent always cooperate (act justly) in every equilibrium with every type of opponent, consistent with a core Socratic moral principle of never committing an injustice under any circumstance, even in retaliation for having an injustice committed against oneself.</p>

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Socrates on virtue, conventional goods, and happiness: a game-theoretic analysis

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年7月8日

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  • Ahmer Tarar

摘要

I present a game-theoretic analysis of Socrates’ moral theory, using the cooperate/defect framework of Prisoner’s Dilemma and Stag Hunt, the two most commonly used game-theoretic models in moral and political philosophy. Based on Plato’s Apology, Crito, and Gorgias, I argue that Socrates presents a preference ordering even more cooperative than that of Stag Hunt. One version is consistent with what Vlastos (1991) calls the Identity Thesis, where an agent’s virtue is the only determinant of her happiness, and the other is consistent with the Sufficiency Thesis, whereby the agent’s virtue is the major determinant of her happiness, but conventional goods also affect this. A repeated-game analysis suggests that, contrary to Vlastos, and consistent with Annas (1999), the Identity Thesis better represents Socrates’ moral theory than does the Sufficiency Thesis, in that only with the former does the agent always cooperate (act justly) in every equilibrium with every type of opponent, consistent with a core Socratic moral principle of never committing an injustice under any circumstance, even in retaliation for having an injustice committed against oneself.