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<p>Two important issues in the philosophy of medicine are <i>the evaluative issue</i> (whether the concept of disease is value-laden) and <i>the neutrality issue</i> (whether the concept of dysfunction is value-laden). The aim of this study was to empirically examine whether a person’s evaluation of their own condition (i.e., patient evaluation) influences whether their condition is considered to be a disease and dysfunction. With respect to the evaluative issue, we observed, consistent with previous research, that patient evaluation does not influence people’s disease judgments, but it does influence their health judgments. Further, with respect to the <i>neutrality issue</i>, we observed that while patient evaluation does not influence people’s dysfunction judgments in physical conditions, it does influence their dysfunction judgments in mental conditions. Depending on exactly how these results are interpreted they might have potentially significant implications for dominant positions in the literature, particularly for those that claim to account for lay judgments. Progress in the philosophy of medicine might benefit from a shift in focus from the concepts of disease and health to a more detailed examination of the concept of dysfunction.</p>

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Is “Dysfunction” a Value-Neutral Concept?

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年6月20日

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  • Somogy Varga,
  • Andrew J. Latham

摘要

Two important issues in the philosophy of medicine are the evaluative issue (whether the concept of disease is value-laden) and the neutrality issue (whether the concept of dysfunction is value-laden). The aim of this study was to empirically examine whether a person’s evaluation of their own condition (i.e., patient evaluation) influences whether their condition is considered to be a disease and dysfunction. With respect to the evaluative issue, we observed, consistent with previous research, that patient evaluation does not influence people’s disease judgments, but it does influence their health judgments. Further, with respect to the neutrality issue, we observed that while patient evaluation does not influence people’s dysfunction judgments in physical conditions, it does influence their dysfunction judgments in mental conditions. Depending on exactly how these results are interpreted they might have potentially significant implications for dominant positions in the literature, particularly for those that claim to account for lay judgments. Progress in the philosophy of medicine might benefit from a shift in focus from the concepts of disease and health to a more detailed examination of the concept of dysfunction.