<p>A standard form of skeptical scenario, in the tradition of Descartes’ evil demon, raises the prospect that our sensory experiences are deceptive. A less familiar and importantly different kind of skeptical scenario raises the prospect that our beliefs have been <i>debased</i> (Schaffer, <CitationRef CitationID="CR29">2010</CitationRef>). This paper provides a new and improved way of resisting this latter kind of debasing skepticism. Along the way, I explore how the debasing demon scenario connects with some potentially controversial epistemological principles and clear up various neglected or misunderstood points concerning debasing skepticism.</p>

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‘On Being Debased’

  • Thomas Raleigh

摘要

A standard form of skeptical scenario, in the tradition of Descartes’ evil demon, raises the prospect that our sensory experiences are deceptive. A less familiar and importantly different kind of skeptical scenario raises the prospect that our beliefs have been debased (Schaffer, 2010). This paper provides a new and improved way of resisting this latter kind of debasing skepticism. Along the way, I explore how the debasing demon scenario connects with some potentially controversial epistemological principles and clear up various neglected or misunderstood points concerning debasing skepticism.