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<p>This paper develops several challenges to recent accounts of incoherence, inspired by familiar challenges to accounts of analyticity. I focus on accounts that claim certain combinations of attitudes are incoherent—i.e., structurally irrational—iff each of their instances satisfies some condition <i>C</i>. After distinguishing between <i>Type-1</i> and <i>Type-2</i> accounts&#xa0;of incoherence, I argue that the former face problems similar to those facing metaphysical accounts of analyticity, while the latter face challenges similar to those facing epistemological accounts of analyticity. The paper concludes by outlining three paths forward for work on incoherence.</p>

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Incoherence and analyticity

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年7月29日

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  • Tez Clark

摘要

This paper develops several challenges to recent accounts of incoherence, inspired by familiar challenges to accounts of analyticity. I focus on accounts that claim certain combinations of attitudes are incoherent—i.e., structurally irrational—iff each of their instances satisfies some condition C. After distinguishing between Type-1 and Type-2 accounts of incoherence, I argue that the former face problems similar to those facing metaphysical accounts of analyticity, while the latter face challenges similar to those facing epistemological accounts of analyticity. The paper concludes by outlining three paths forward for work on incoherence.