<p>Inclosure paradoxes are those logical paradoxes that correspond to legitimate instances of a certain formal schema, the inclosure schema. Graham Priest has argued that the Sorites paradox is among them, and that all inclosure paradoxes require the same kind of solution. In this paper, I present the Sorites paradox and the inclosure schema and then some initial objections to Priest’s argument. I then present a response on behalf of a Priest-like dialetheist, conceding that the Sorites is not an inclosure paradox, but arguing that a similar paradox, the Inclosure Sorites, is, and that this paradox admits of a dialetheic solution that is of the same form as those offered for the other inclosure paradoxes. In the process, I argue for a strong version of the Principle of Uniform Solution. I then present a further objection involving a sequence of paradoxes similar to the Inclosure Sorites, and again respond on behalf of a Priest-like dialetheist. The response introduces a new constraint on legitimacy, the Condition on Claims.</p>