Epistemic negligence: between performance and evidence

At first blush, Sosa’s performance-based approach to epistemic normativity would seem to put us in a position to illuminate important types of epistemic negligence – types whose epistemic significance will be denied by standard evidentialist theories. But while Sosa’s theory does indeed venture beyond standard evidentialism, it fails to provide an adequate account of epistemic negligence. The challenge arises in cases in which a subject is negligent in that she knowingly fails to perform inquiries which it was her responsibility to perform, but where she had good (undefeated) reason to believe that had she done so her judgment would only have been reinforced, and where this higher-order judgment was apt. After arguing that these cases will pose problems for Sosa’s view, I diagnose the difficulty as one that will face any view that treats epistemic negligence either in exclusively performance-theoretic terms or exclusively evidential terms.