<p>What makes something aesthetically valuable? The fitting-attitude (FA) theory famously answers: the appropriateness of the subject’s response. Yet this answer is increasingly under pressure, especially as renewed interest in aesthetic realism has called into question whether value depends on attitudes. This paper takes up this tension and explores how early phenomenological realism can reframe the FA theory in a new, dual-aspect light. On this view, emotional attitudes are not value-constituting but value-disclosing: they serve as normatively structured modes of responsiveness to values already inherent in the object. Rather than abandoning the FA approach, this model transforms it—preserving its normative insights while rejecting its ontological commitments. By integrating phenomenological distinctions between types of affect and modes of attention, this reconfiguration restores the epistemic and normative force of fitting attitudes without collapsing into subjectivism, offering a renewed foundation for thinking about normativity.</p>