Hinge epistemology, kink-free enactivism and a biological argument against radical scepticism

This paper focuses on Moyal-Sharrock’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s concept of “hinges”, as presented in her recent book Certainty in Action: Wittgenstein on Language, Mind and Epistemology. Moyal-Sharrock’s “Hinge Epistemology” proposes that basic certainties, or hinges, resist the regress problem of epistemic justification, serving as ungrounded and nonpropositional foundations of knowledge. This aligns with her “Kink-free Enactivism”, which responds to Hutto and Myin’s perspective on the kinky emergence of higher forms of cognition. While Moyal-Sharrock rejects the idea that intrinsic biological structures determine noncognitive certainties, I suggest that we explore the possibility of integrating a biological dimension into her framework to better address the challenge of external world scepticism.