<p>Based on the environmental feedback, a co-evolutionary game model is constructed to investigate the evolutionary mechanism of individual behaviors, especially when we take into account the interaction between environments, actions and opinions. In the model, environmental states, actions and opinions are tightly integrated within a game-theoretic framework, and evolutionary game theory is used for analyzing their co-evolutionary processes and outcomes. The results show that individual environments, actions and opinions can converge to a stable equilibrium over a limited period of time. Interestingly, when the population plays the prisoner’s dilemma, the system appear an oscillatory phenomenon, which implies the extensive waste of resources. However, the system can be effectively circumvented from entering an oscillatory state by reasonably adjusting the payoff matrix. In addition, the environment will be an effective factor in guiding individuals out of the prisoner’s dilemma, thus facilitating the emergence of cooperative behaviors. Furthermore, the current model also demonstrates the robustness and maintains the stability of the system even confronted with other changes or disturbances.</p>

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Exploring the coevolutionary dynamics between individual actions, opinions and environments

  • Jiaquan Huang,
  • Yuying Zhu,
  • Dawei Zhao,
  • Chengyi Xia,
  • Jun Tanimoto

摘要

Based on the environmental feedback, a co-evolutionary game model is constructed to investigate the evolutionary mechanism of individual behaviors, especially when we take into account the interaction between environments, actions and opinions. In the model, environmental states, actions and opinions are tightly integrated within a game-theoretic framework, and evolutionary game theory is used for analyzing their co-evolutionary processes and outcomes. The results show that individual environments, actions and opinions can converge to a stable equilibrium over a limited period of time. Interestingly, when the population plays the prisoner’s dilemma, the system appear an oscillatory phenomenon, which implies the extensive waste of resources. However, the system can be effectively circumvented from entering an oscillatory state by reasonably adjusting the payoff matrix. In addition, the environment will be an effective factor in guiding individuals out of the prisoner’s dilemma, thus facilitating the emergence of cooperative behaviors. Furthermore, the current model also demonstrates the robustness and maintains the stability of the system even confronted with other changes or disturbances.