<p>Cognitive Dissonance Theory (CDT) posits that inconsistencies between prior beliefs and external information can elicit an aversive state and motivate regulatory responses. However, the conditions under which cognitive inconsistency translates into effortful behavioral regulation remain insufficiently specified, particularly with respect to the role of personal importance. Across two studies, we examined whether the motivational impact of cognitive inconsistency depends on the perceived importance of the discrepant domain. In Study 1 (<i>N</i> = 294), participants received negative feedback contradicting their self-assessments, inducing cognitive inconsistency of varying magnitude. Greater inconsistency predicted increased willingness to engage in effortful reduction behavior only when the relevant domain was perceived as personally important. Study 2 (<i>N</i> = 346) replicated this interactive pattern using an experimental manipulation of importance and further showed that subjective dissonant arousal alone did not reliably predict effortful engagement in the absence of high importance. Together, these findings suggest that cognitive inconsistency, subjective arousal, and effortful regulation represent distinct components of the dissonance process, and that the motivational consequences of inconsistency are conditional on the perceived importance of the cognitive domain.</p>