Recent cases of forced explantation of neurotechnologies seem to be grounded on a pre-theoretical naturalist conception of the body as an entity that cannot have a non-biological object as a proper part. However, this conception has been challenged by functional approaches, according to which if an artifact robustly contributes to the function of a body, it is part of it and should be legally treated as such. Bublitz (2022) argues that a series of problems would result from revising the law to accommodate an extended functionalist view and, for this reason, naturalism is the best option. We claim that it is unacceptable to endorse naturalism for purely pragmatic reasons while recognizing that it is theoretically groundless. We argue that contemporary versions of Autopoietic Theory can be used to provide a theoretically sound naturalistic view. We articulate a criterion for the attribution of degrees of bodiliness to any given object, depending on how closely it is related to autopoiesis, and then specify a threshold that defines the degree required to be a part of the body. Crucially, according to our view, only a very restricted set of devices can become body parts, which significantly mitigates the legal problems of body/device hybridization.
