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<p>The paper explores one of the issues raised at the Amsterdam Symposium on Virtue, Law and AI, held on March 14–15, 2024, at the Amsterdam Law School. In particular, it investigates the Counterfactual Version of Legal Justification by Virtue (also “CV”) proposed by Amalia Amaya, evaluating its applicability to AI systems. Owing to the constitutive role of virtues in the theory advanced by the Author, the paper suggests that the CV does not seem to be consistently applicable to AI systems. The text is structured as follows: Section 1 will introduce scope and opportunity of this investigation; Section 2 will analyze the CV, pointing out its main features; Section 3, after investigating what seems to be, <i>prima facie</i>, a reason to support the applicability of the CV in AI systems, will subsequently focus on issues connected to particularities of legal reasoning, such as distinction between easy cases and hard cases (paragraph 3.1) and counterfactual reasoning (paragraph 3.2). Section&#xa0; 4 is finally dedicated to remarks encouraging the inclusion of the European regulation in the research agenda on virtue-based approaches to law and AI systems.</p>

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On the Counterfactual Version of Legal Justification by Virtue: What About the Applicability to AI Systems?

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年2月28日

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  • Silvia Corradi

摘要

The paper explores one of the issues raised at the Amsterdam Symposium on Virtue, Law and AI, held on March 14–15, 2024, at the Amsterdam Law School. In particular, it investigates the Counterfactual Version of Legal Justification by Virtue (also “CV”) proposed by Amalia Amaya, evaluating its applicability to AI systems. Owing to the constitutive role of virtues in the theory advanced by the Author, the paper suggests that the CV does not seem to be consistently applicable to AI systems. The text is structured as follows: Section 1 will introduce scope and opportunity of this investigation; Section 2 will analyze the CV, pointing out its main features; Section 3, after investigating what seems to be, prima facie, a reason to support the applicability of the CV in AI systems, will subsequently focus on issues connected to particularities of legal reasoning, such as distinction between easy cases and hard cases (paragraph 3.1) and counterfactual reasoning (paragraph 3.2). Section  4 is finally dedicated to remarks encouraging the inclusion of the European regulation in the research agenda on virtue-based approaches to law and AI systems.