<p>As courts adopt AI technologies—from predictive analytics to decision-support systems—the role of human judgment in adjudication is undergoing a profound transformation. This article proposes that the ethical use of AI in judicial reasoning should be evaluated through the lens of virtue jurisprudence, and specifically through a set of techno-legal virtues for hybrid human-machine decision-making. Drawing on virtue jurisprudence and technomoral theory, I introduce a typology of techno-legal judicial virtues, including techno-legal phronesis, contestatory courage, algorithmic equity, and digital integrity. These virtues respond to challenges posed by epistemic opacity, automation bias, latent digital injustice, and normative fragmentation of judicial AI support systems. Grounded in the theory of virtue and adapted to AI-infused legal practice, they articulate a normative framework for the judge as a responsible, morally responsive agent within distributed epistemic systems. The article contributes to the emerging discourse on AI ethics in law by offering a theory of judicial techno-legal virtue adequate to the demands of algorithmically augmented adjudication.</p>