<p>Debates over distributive justice often agree that the worse-off deserve priority, yet disagree about when and on what basis someone counts as worse-off. Two dimensions structure these disagreements: the temporal unit (lifetime vs. time-slice assessment) and the currency (welfare, resources, capabilities, or other goods). This article develops a form of time-slice prioritarianism—future-oriented chance prioritarianism—which identifies the worse-off as those with the lowest near-term survival prospects. On this view, survival chances, rather than welfare or life-years, function as the distributive currency to which diminishing marginal weight applies. After situating the view within the landscape of lifetime and time-slice prioritarianisms, I analyze a stylized vaccine-allocation case to show how weighting survival prospects can diverge from utilitarian or standard welfarist prioritarian recommendations, and how the verdict flips when we switch the reference class (whole cohort vs. infected subpopulation). I then address two conceptual challenges: (i) clarifying the factors relevant for assigning normative weight to risk concentration, when it conflicts with aggregate outcomes; and (ii) diagnosing the partition-sensitivity of who counts as worse-off and its interaction with interpretations of probability.</p>