<p>Appeals to vulnerability are widespread in bioethics, yet they continue to face criticism. One line of critique concerns their normative force, with two major sceptical claims dominating the debate. The strong version holds that vulnerability alone carries little or no normative force. The moderate version grants some role but denies that it has the same normative force as concepts such as wrong or wronging. I revisit these claims in light of Catriona Mackenzie’s rejoinder, which shifts the focus from relational or situational vulnerability to its ontological sense, framed as a morally salient feature of humanity. While Mackenzie’s account is novel, it faces challenges from the needs‑theory literature she draws on, where dependence appears a more direct basis for grounding obligations related to vital needs. I examine Mackenzie’s favoured argumentative strategy of intertwining dependence and ontological vulnerability, and I argue that even if one accepts intertwinement in functional co‑constitution sense, this would not by itself establish vulnerability as a foundational obligation‑grounding concept. I then consider possible avenues for vulnerability defenders. I argue that the option of identifying another transitive intra‑conceptual relation between dependence and vulnerability is not readily available. A second option is to claim that ontological vulnerability is foundational not through a transitive relation from dependence but because both are morally salient. I argue that the stronger sense of moral salience implies obligation‑grounding, making the argument circular; and that the weaker sense, understood as mere moral relevance, leaves the account open to the very sceptical challenge it aims to resist.</p>