<p>While Gauld et al. correctly argue that warranted clinical exclusion of patient narratives need not constitute epistemic injustice, this paper introduces epistemic disadvantage, a coextensive but distinct category of harm. Drawing on its three conditions, I show how epistemic harm persists even when exclusions are non-prejudicial and justified, contributing to clinical ethical obligations.</p>

错误:搜索内容不能为空,请输入英文关键词
错误:关键词超出字数限制,请精简
高级检索

Epistemic disadvantage and looping breaks: a reply to Gauld et al.

  • Rena Alcalay

摘要

While Gauld et al. correctly argue that warranted clinical exclusion of patient narratives need not constitute epistemic injustice, this paper introduces epistemic disadvantage, a coextensive but distinct category of harm. Drawing on its three conditions, I show how epistemic harm persists even when exclusions are non-prejudicial and justified, contributing to clinical ethical obligations.